feat: removed basic auth and added sqlite logging
This commit is contained in:
262
auth.go
262
auth.go
@@ -1,332 +1,188 @@
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// auth.go — core authentication logic and HTTP handlers
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//
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// The authentication flow is:
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//
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// 1. Extract the client's real IP (see NGINX config for how we set X-Real-IP).
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// 2. Check the permanent whitelist. If the IP is whitelisted, allow.
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// 3. Check the temporary whitelist. If the IP is whitelisted AND not expired, allow.
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// 4. Fall back to HTTP Basic Auth.
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//
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// Why this order?
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//
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// - Permanent whitelist: checked first for speed (O(1) map lookup).
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// - Temporary whitelist: checked second. The expiry check is also O(1).
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// - Basic Auth: checked last because it requires hashing (bcrypt).
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//
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// Security note: we use X-Real-IP (set by NGINX from the TCP peer IP) rather
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// than X-Forwarded-For. X-Forwarded-For is client-controlled and can be
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// spoofed. If you need a CDN, configure the realip module instead of trusting
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// the header.
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package main
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import (
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"encoding/base64"
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"database/sql"
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"encoding/json"
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"fmt"
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"log"
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"log/slog"
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"net/http"
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"sort"
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"sync"
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"time"
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_ "modernc.org/sqlite"
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)
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// tempEntry represents a temporary whitelisted IP with a TTL.
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type tempEntry struct {
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IP string `json:"ip"`
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Reason string `json:"reason,omitempty"`
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Expires time.Time `json:"expires"`
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}
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// tempWhitelist is the in-memory store for temporary whitelisted IPs.
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//
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// Why in-memory instead of a database?
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//
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// - The TTL-based expiry pattern is simple to implement with a map.
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// - No external dependencies.
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// - If you need persistence, add a SQLite/Redis layer later.
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//
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// The mutex protects concurrent reads and writes.
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type tempWhitelist struct {
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mu sync.RWMutex
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entries map[string]tempEntry
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}
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func newTempWhitelist() *tempWhitelist {
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return &tempWhitelist{
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entries: make(map[string]tempEntry),
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}
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return &tempWhitelist{entries: make(map[string]tempEntry)}
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}
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// PermanentWhitelist is the in-memory store for the permanent whitelist
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// loaded from disk (see watcher.go).
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type PermanentWhitelist struct {
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mu sync.RWMutex
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entries map[string]struct{}
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}
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func newPermanentWhitelist() *PermanentWhitelist {
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return &PermanentWhitelist{
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entries: make(map[string]struct{}),
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}
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return &PermanentWhitelist{entries: make(map[string]struct{})}
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}
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// CheckAuth returns true if the request's IP is whitelisted or the
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// Authorization header contains valid Basic Auth credentials.
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//
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// The function is stateless: it reads from the two whitelist maps
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// and compares credentials. No session state.
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//
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// Why does this function return only a bool?
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//
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// - It keeps the function testable: you can feed it any Request
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// and verify the result without spinning up a server.
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// - The HTTP handler (authHandler) is responsible for translating
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// the bool into the correct HTTP response.
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func (tw *tempWhitelist) CheckAuth(r *http.Request, perm *PermanentWhitelist, user, pass string) bool {
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func (tw *tempWhitelist) CheckAuth(r *http.Request, perm *PermanentWhitelist) bool {
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ip := r.Header.Get("X-Real-IP")
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if ip == "" {
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return false
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}
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// Check permanent whitelist (fast path).
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perm.mu.RLock()
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_, ok := perm.entries[ip]
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perm.mu.RUnlock()
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if ok {
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return true
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}
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// Check temporary whitelist.
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tw.mu.RLock()
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if e, exists := tw.entries[ip]; exists && e.Expires.After(time.Now()) {
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tw.mu.RUnlock()
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return true
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}
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tw.mu.RUnlock()
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// Fall back to Basic Auth.
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return checkBasicAuth(r, user, pass)
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return false
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}
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// checkBasicAuth validates the HTTP Basic Auth header.
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//
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// Why not use a library like "golang.org/x/crypto/bcrypt"?
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//
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// - The standard library only supports plaintext comparison, which is
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// what we need for a simple auth gateway. If you want password hashing,
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// add bcrypt later.
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//
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// The implementation follows the RFC 7617 spec for Basic Auth.
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func checkBasicAuth(r *http.Request, user, pass string) bool {
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const prefix = "Basic "
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auth := r.Header.Get("Authorization")
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if auth == "" {
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return false
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}
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if len(auth) < len(prefix) || auth[:len(prefix)] != prefix {
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return false
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}
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decoded, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(auth[len(prefix):])
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if err != nil {
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return false
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}
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parts := splitColon(string(decoded))
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if len(parts) != 2 {
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return false
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}
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return parts[0] == user && parts[1] == pass
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}
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// splitColon splits a string by the first colon, returning at most two parts.
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//
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// Why not strings.SplitN?
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//
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// - It works, but splitColon is more explicit about the intent and
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// avoids the allocation of the full parts slice.
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func splitColon(s string) []string {
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i := 0
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for i < len(s) && s[i] != ':' {
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i++
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}
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return []string{s[:i], s[i+1:]}
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}
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// --- API endpoints ---
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// authHandler is the NGINX auth_request endpoint.
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//
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// NGINX sends a subrequest to this endpoint. On 200 the original request
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// proceeds. On 401/403 NGINX returns the response to the client.
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//
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// We set the WWW-Authenticate header on 401 so that browsers show the
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// login dialog automatically. This is the standard HTTP Basic Auth flow.
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func authHandler(cfg Config, tw *tempWhitelist, perm *PermanentWhitelist) http.HandlerFunc {
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return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if !tw.CheckAuth(r, perm, cfg.BasicAuthUser, cfg.BasicAuthPass) {
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// 401 Unauthorized — the browser should show a login dialog.
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w.Header().Set("WWW-Authenticate", `Basic realm="Restricted"`)
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if !tw.CheckAuth(r, perm) {
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)
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return
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}
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// 200 — allow the request.
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
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}
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}
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// whitelistTempHandler creates a new temporary whitelisted IP.
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//
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// Expected request:
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//
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// POST /api/whitelist/temp
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// Authorization: Bearer <api-token>
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//
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// Body (JSON):
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//
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// {
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// "ip": "1.2.3.4",
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// "ttl_seconds": 300,
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// "reason": "my laptop"
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// }
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func (tw *tempWhitelist) whitelistTempHandler(cfg Config) http.HandlerFunc {
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func (tw *tempWhitelist) whitelistTempHandler(cfg Config, db *sql.DB) http.HandlerFunc {
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return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if !verifyAPIKey(r, cfg.APIToken) {
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http.Error(w, "unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
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return
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}
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if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
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http.Error(w, "method not allowed", http.StatusMethodNotAllowed)
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return
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}
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type request struct {
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IP string `json:"ip"`
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TTLSeconds int `json:"ttl_seconds"`
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Reason string `json:"reason,omitempty"`
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}
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var req request
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if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&req); err != nil {
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http.Error(w, "bad request", http.StatusBadRequest)
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return
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}
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if req.IP == "" || req.TTLSeconds <= 0 {
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http.Error(w, "ip and ttl_seconds are required", http.StatusBadRequest)
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http.Error(w, "ip and ttl_seconds required", http.StatusBadRequest)
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return
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}
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expires := time.Now().Add(time.Duration(req.TTLSeconds) * time.Second)
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tw.mu.Lock()
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tw.entries[req.IP] = tempEntry{
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IP: req.IP,
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Reason: req.Reason,
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Expires: time.Now().Add(time.Duration(req.TTLSeconds) * time.Second),
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}
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tw.entries[req.IP] = tempEntry{IP: req.IP, Reason: req.Reason, Expires: expires}
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tw.mu.Unlock()
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log.Printf("whitelisted %s for %ds (%s)", req.IP, req.TTLSeconds, req.Reason)
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go logWhitelistEvent(db, "add_temp", req.IP, req.TTLSeconds, req.Reason)
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slog.Info("whitelist added", "ip", req.IP, "ttl", req.TTLSeconds, "reason", req.Reason)
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
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}
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}
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// whitelistListHandler lists all currently active temporary whitelisted IPs.
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func (tw *tempWhitelist) whitelistListHandler(cfg Config) http.HandlerFunc {
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return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if !verifyAPIKey(r, cfg.APIToken) {
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http.Error(w, "unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
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return
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}
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tw.mu.RLock()
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entries := make([]tempEntry, 0, len(tw.entries))
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for _, e := range tw.entries {
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entries = append(entries, e)
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}
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tw.mu.RUnlock()
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// Sort by expiry time for predictable output.
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sort.Slice(entries, func(i, j int) bool {
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return entries[i].Expires.Before(entries[j].Expires)
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})
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(entries)
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}
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}
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// whitelistDeleteHandler removes a temporary whitelisted IP.
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func (tw *tempWhitelist) whitelistDeleteHandler(cfg Config) http.HandlerFunc {
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func (tw *tempWhitelist) whitelistDeleteHandler(cfg Config, db *sql.DB) http.HandlerFunc {
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return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if !verifyAPIKey(r, cfg.APIToken) {
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http.Error(w, "unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
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return
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}
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ip := r.PathValue("ip") // or r.URL.Query()["ip"][0] for older Go
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ip := r.PathValue("ip")
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if ip == "" {
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http.Error(w, "ip is required", http.StatusBadRequest)
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http.Error(w, "ip required", http.StatusBadRequest)
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return
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}
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tw.mu.Lock()
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delete(tw.entries, ip)
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tw.mu.Unlock()
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log.Printf("removed temporary whitelist for %s", ip)
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go logWhitelistEvent(db, "delete_temp", ip, 0, "", getAPIUser(r))
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slog.Info("whitelist deleted", "ip", ip)
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
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}
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}
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// statusHandler is a health-check endpoint.
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func statusHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/plain")
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fmt.Fprintln(w, "ok")
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}
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// newAuthServer creates the HTTP server with all routes.
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//
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// We use a single server instance for all endpoints so that the listener
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// is created once and the route table is built once. This is simpler than
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// multiple servers and avoids the complexity of a reverse-proxy setup
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// within the service itself.
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func newAuthServer(cfg Config, addr string) *http.Server {
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mux := http.NewServeMux()
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tw := newTempWhitelist()
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perm := newPermanentWhitelist()
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// Auth endpoint (called by NGINX).
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mux.HandleFunc("/auth", authHandler(cfg, tw, perm))
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// API endpoints (admin-only, requires API key).
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mux.HandleFunc("/api/whitelist/temp", tw.whitelistTempHandler(cfg))
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mux.HandleFunc("/api/whitelist", tw.whitelistListHandler(cfg))
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mux.HandleFunc("/api/whitelist/{ip}", tw.whitelistDeleteHandler(cfg))
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// Health check.
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mux.HandleFunc("/status", statusHandler)
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return &http.Server{
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Addr: addr,
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Handler: mux,
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ReadTimeout: 10 * time.Second,
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WriteTimeout: 30 * time.Second,
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func logsHandler(cfg Config, db *sql.DB) http.HandlerFunc {
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return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if !verifyAPIKey(r, cfg.APIToken) {
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http.Error(w, "unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
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return
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}
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rows, err := db.Query(`SELECT timestamp, action, ip, ttl_seconds, reason, api_user
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FROM whitelist_audit ORDER BY timestamp DESC LIMIT 100`)
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if err != nil {
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http.Error(w, "database error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
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return
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}
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defer rows.Close()
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var logs []map[string]interface{}
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for rows.Next() {
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var ts time.Time
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var action, ip, reason, apiUser string
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var ttl int
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if err := rows.Scan(&ts, &action, &ip, &ttl, &reason); err != nil {
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continue
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}
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logs = append(logs, map[string]interface{}{
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"timestamp": ts,
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"action": action,
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"ip": ip,
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"ttl": ttl,
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"reason": reason,
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})
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}
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
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json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(logs)
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}
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}
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// verifyAPIKey checks that the Authorization header contains the expected
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// bearer token.
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//
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// Why bearer token for the API?
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//
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// - It's the standard convention for REST APIs.
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// - Easy to test with curl: -H "Authorization: Bearer xxx".
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// - Doesn't require username/password in the URL.
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func verifyAPIKey(r *http.Request, expectedToken string) bool {
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auth := r.Header.Get("Authorization")
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return auth == "Bearer "+expectedToken
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func statusHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/plain")
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w.Write([]byte("ok\n"))
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}
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func verifyAPIKey(r *http.Request, expectedToken string) bool {
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return r.Header.Get("Authorization") == "Bearer "+expectedToken
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}
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